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Abstract
With urbanization and cellular subscribership rising
sharply, cellular use in urban locales has become a
normative behavior for the majority of the world’s
population. As the research community pushes the
limits of what is possible in the next generation cellular
arena, it is prudent to simultaneously hold in tension
the responsibility to provide appropriate protections
to the ultimate end users of such technology. To this
end, this research illustrates a location-based attack
in modern cellular networks. This attack leverages
control information sent over the radio access network
without the benefit of encryption. We show how this at-
tack is particularly potent in urban localization where
it is important to infer location in three dimensions. We
quantify the efficacy of such an attack, and therefore
the associated location privacy, through simulation
both in a generic cellular environment and in an
environment modeled after downtown Honolulu. Our
results show that accuracy on the order of 15 meters
is possible.
1. Introduction
Urbanization is a fact of modern demography. In-
deed, most of the world’s population currently lives in
urban areas and population shift rates to urban centers
of up to 80% have been seen in recent years. With a
projected worldwide urban population of three billion,
60% of the projected five billion strong global popu-
lation, city centers become an increasingly important
area for researchers to consider [1].
Additionally, the areas which saw the most growth in
cellular subscribership in the last quarter of 2016 were
China and India [2], the two countries also expected
to contribute the most to global urbanization between
now and 2050 [1]. This fact, and the fact that global
subscribership penetration has risen above 100% [2]
highlight the need for an awareness in the cellular
research community of the impact and effects of this
burgeoning technology on our global society. With the
first deployment of 5G looming on the horizon of the
upcoming winter Olympics in one of the worlds most
populous urban centers [3], consideration of the effect
that 4G has had when designing the future evolution
of interconnectivity is prudent.
The privacy and security of cellular networks has
long been considered [4]. Indeed, Chief Justice John
Roberts of the United States Supreme Court wrote
in an opinion that “The fact that technology [cell
phone] now allows an individual to carry such infor-
mation in his hand does not make the information any
less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
fought” [5]. While the privacy of the content of our
digital communications is generally held as axiomatic,
the privacy associated with the location of the user
equipment (UE) is less often regarded. Consider over
the last decade the normalization of mobile device
ownership as evidenced by the aforementioned statis-
tics. Previous to this paradigm shift, it was well-known
that a cyber-persona existed in the digital world as
an expression of our identity rooted in the physical.
Now, the mobile device, or UE, provides a connection
between that digital cyber-persona and the physical
world. Thus, the nascence of location-privacy, while
not often touted, is an emerging threat to the increas-
ingly digital fabric of society.
To this end, this research serves to raise awareness
of location-privacy concerns in next generation cellular
networks, which we define as Long Term Evolution
(LTE) and emerging 5G trends as well as parallel
standards such as Worldwide Interoperability for Mi-
crowave Access (WiMAX). Because of the popularity
of the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP) standards, we
frame the manuscript in the context of the associated
protocols, however we acknowledge the applicability
of this research also to peer cellular standards. Specif-
ically, we present a generalization of a previously re-








Figure 1: The challenge of mobility management in OFDMA-enabled cellular networks is shown in this
figure. Because UE 1 is closer than UE 2, its variable propagation delay must be compensated for by
adjusting their uplink burst time via the TA such that their frames will arrive at the serving eNB relative to an
absolute schedule maintained at the eNB.
ported vulnerability to the LTE standard [6], [7] which
examines the vulnerability in the context of urban city
centers where the majority of cellular subscribership is
growing. In this environment, high-rise buildings are
manifold thus making the requirement for positioning
in three dimensions R3 a necessity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the relevant background to cellu-
lar positioning. The subsequent section describes the
theoretical framework necessary to evaluate cellular
positioning in R3. Next, Section 4 provides a summary
background of the relevant vulnerability in LTE which
underscores modern cellular location-privacy concerns.
We then propose an extension to the previously intro-
duced exploit highlighting its relevance to positioning
in three dimensions. This exploit, and implication for
location privacy in R3, is then quantified in Section 6
via simulation. Finally, a summary discussion is pro-
vided in Section 7.
2. Location-Based Exploitation in Cellular
Networks
Location-based services (LBS) are now a presumed
component of cellular service. The prevalence of pop-
ular mobile applications allowing users to voluntarily
“check in” to geographic locations as well as the
necessity for emergency first responders to locate those
requesting such services are exemplar cases for legit-
imate cellular localization. Indeed, LBS are enabled
specifically in the LTE standard via a dedicated LTE
Positioning Protocol (LPP) [8]. Despite the require-
ment for this service, it does not negate the need for
standard architecture to be designed to protect against
its unauthorized use. In fact, LPP does just this by
making use of encrypted sessions to transport data
to and from the LBS client. However, less obvious
portions of the standard unwittingly provide a would-
be attacker information as to a the location of a
potential victim in the form of a timing advance (TA).
The TA is a necessary artifact of wide-area cellular
networks operating under an orthogonal frequency-
division multiple access (OFDMA) scheme [9]. The
necessity of the TA comes from the need to manage UE
mobility throughout the serving area. OFDMA requires
that UE uplink bursts arrive in strictly scheduled time
slots at the base station, also known as the enhanced-
Node B (eNB). In order to meet this requirement, the
network must be able to compensate for a varying
propagation delay from a mobile UE to the serving
eNB, as shown in Figure 1. In LTE this is accomplished
with the TA.
Because the TA provides a link between distance and
time, its use as a positioning tool has been studied ever
since its inception in the Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) [10], [11]. However, it never
gained much traction due to its limited ability to
provide UE-eNB distance information. In GSM, timing
requirements were lax enough that the TA would
only provide information accurate to 550 m at most,
hardly enough to spur interest [11]. These limitations
notwithstanding, the tighter timing requirements in
LTE provide a level of accuracy up to 78.125 m [12],
which bring the TA back under consideration as a
viable method for cellular localization. Unfortunately,
the security architecture of LTE does not afford for
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the confidentiality of the TA and other signaling plane
information critical for the protection of user privacy
as it is not encrypted [7], [13]. As this information is
sent in the clear, it provides the vehicle for location ex-
ploitation in LTE. This exploit can be further enhanced
with the previously introduced Cellular Synchroniza-
tion Assisted Refinement (CeSAR) method [6], [7],
which is summarized in a subsequent section.
The TA has been previously considered formally as
a location privacy preserving mechanism (LPPM) [13],
[14] with both a user anonymization component (the
cell-radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI) [9])
and an information obscurity component (the dis-
cretization of distance via the TA [15]). The obscurity
component of the LPPM is described with the model
d̂i =∥ p − xi ∥2 +UTA, (1)
where d̂i is the perceived distance from the ith eNB
and the UE, xi = [xi, yi]T is the location of the ith
eNB, p = [x, y]T is the location of the UE, and UTA
is a uniform random variable (RV) which represents the
quantization noise introduced by the binary nature of
the TA [15]. The efficacy, however, of the information
obscurity is inversely proportional to data rate [7].
Thus, as data rates increase towards 5G levels, location
privacy will decline as long as the aforementioned
signaling data remains unencrypted. Although not the
focus of this paper, similar concerns have been raised
about the quality of anonymity provided the user via
the C-RNTI [4], [16], making the legitimacy of the
overall 3GPP model for user privacy suspect.
Exploration of this vulnerability has only been un-
dertaken in the context of approximately flat tracking
areas where R2 is a suitable model. On the other hand,
urban locales constitute a decidedly three-dimensional
tracking area where R3 is a more appropriate model.
The result of a localization model in R2 when the
infrastructure lies in R3 has been previously studied
and revealed that consideration of the third orthogo-
nal dimension provided the information necessary to
provide significant gains in localization accuracy [17].
We add to these past contributions, by showing how
the CeSAR method can be used to exploit the LTE
signaling plane to continue to improve localization
accuracy in R3 under the assumption of a target UE
which is not at ground level.
3. A Localization Bound in R3
In this section, we introduce and utilize the Cramér-
Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) as an appropriate metric
through which to understanding the positioning sce-
nario. We first develop the bound as classically used
in R2 and then generalize it to R3.
3.1. The Cramér-Rao Lower Bound
The CRLB is a statistical lower bound on the accu-
racy of an unbiased estimator [18]. In our application,
that estimator p̂ = [x̂, ŷ]T is attempting to infer an
actual UE position p = [x, y]T . The CRLB is an
ergodic bound defined by the trace of the inverse of




where the Fisher information matrix I is given by [19]
I = −E{ ∂
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When the parameter to be estimated is p = [x, y]T , the

















































The implication of the definition of the CRLB in
(2) is that the conditioning of I is critical so that
the inverse can be found. From (4) it can be seen
that I becomes ill-conditioned as all eNBs and the
target UE become approximately collinear. This result
is generalized to R3 as I becomes ill-conditioned when
all eNBs are approximately coplanar. This can be
proven by observing that I becomes singular when
the infrastructure is collinear (cf. (4)) or coplaner (cf.
(5)) since the determinant goes to zero. It is intuitively
satisfying to observe that when the entirety of the
infrastructure is in Rn that information provided in the
n + 1th orthogonal dimension will be nil.
3.2. A Case Study in R3 Localization
To further appreciate the implications in R3 to
positioning, consider a 20 story high-rise building,
which lies at the center of a triangle of three eNBs,
each 55 m high. It can be shown from (4) that this is
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Figure 2: The theoretical positioning performance
with three eNBs inside a 20 story building is
presented. The performance is shown to degrade
when the UE approaches the same height as
the supporting infrastructure. Further, the perfor-
mance is shown to be similarly poor when the
infrastructure and target UE have uniformly dis-
tributed heights. The effects of poor positioning
performance are shown to be abated by establish-
ing a fourth node at the base of the building.
an optimal geometry for information in R2 when there
are three eNBs.
Now, let the geometric dilution of precision (GDoP)
be the Fisher information matrix I when σ = 1 for
all eNBs. Under this condition, the matrix in (4) or
(5) is just a function of geometry. GDoP is then a
useful lens through which to view positioning accuracy
since it can be interpreted as the scale factor, set by
the participating infrastructure, that relates the distance
measurement accuracy to overall positioning accuracy
by [19]
σp̂ = GDoP × σd̂ . (6)
First, referring to the results presented in Figure 2,
consider the GDoP calculated when the target UE is
in each floor of the building. In this result, we see that
performance exponentially degrades as the target UE
approaches the height of the eNBs. In fact, when the
UE is at exactly the height of the infrastructure, the
positioning performance is infinitely poor due to no
information in the z-direction being conveyed (cf. (5)).
Therefore, this reveals a difficulty in urban positioning
in that the region which is approximately coplanar to
the surrounding infrastructure defines a region of very
poor theoretical performance.
Practically, cellular infrastructure is not coplanar
(although one cannot rule out situations of approximate
coplanarity). To understand the effect of positioning
performance on infrastructure of varying height we
let the height of each eNB be uniformly distributed
along with the UE height. The expected positioning
performance, as expressed by GDoP is also shown
in Figure 2. Although this model virtually guarantees
I will never be singular, this result still shows areas
of significant performance degradation, namely around
the center of the extrema of the UE heights. Thus, it is
not in practical deployment geometries that resolution
will be found.
Consider now a scenario where, in addition to the
existing eNBs there is an additional node at the base
of the building. With this model in mind, we repeat the
first experiment where the infrastructure height is left
constant at 55 m and the results are presented alongside
the previous results in Figure 2. Here we see the local
phenomenon of poor performance near the height of
the eNBs nullified due to the introduction of informa-
tion parallel to the previously missing dimension. The
results of the second experiment with the new model
is also shown in Figure 2. Again we see a reduction
of previous poor performance by the information made
possible by the new node.
Thus, we find a significant problem in urban po-
sitioning performance when only surrounding infras-
tructure is utilized: there are likely regions of low
accuracy at significant heights. However, we find that
these regions of concern are removed when a ground
level node is introduced. The nature and scope of this
terminal will be the subject of the discussion in the
next section.
4. Cellular Synchronization Assisted Re-
finement
CeSAR is a previously introduced [6], [20] method
of passive location refinement suitable for protocols
which provide wireless access to large area networks
via a time-division multiple access (TDMA) scheme,
or variant thereof, such as 4G/LTE and also potentially
5G [3], [21]. Previous work has shown CeSAR to be
able to mitigate the effects of poor GDoP in R2 which
improves TA-based accuracy to as tight as 40 m [7].
At its core, CeSAR is a TA-based localization
method which enables its passive nature. TA-based
localization in cellular networks is not a new con-
cept [10], [11], but the tighter timing requirements of
LTE relative to legacy standards, such as GSM, make
practical levels of accuracy possible. Further, the intro-
duction of a extra-network sensor facilitates a higher
level of accuracy through introduction of a new node
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and the flexibility to mitigate the dilution of accuracy
of potentially poor network infrastructure geometry
(which LBS is typically beholden to) [22]. These
effects come at no cost of bandwidth to the network
due to its passive nature, which simultaneously act as
a force multiplier for network operators [22] and a
latent signaling plane vulnerability making attribution
and detection of unauthorized positioning difficult [13].
A summary of the CeSAR method is as follows.1
First, an extra-network sensor is required. This sensor
need not be complicated or expensive. In fact, due to
the introduction of software-defined radio (SDR), the
sensor could be implemented by an amateur operator.
The sensor first synchronizes to the serving eNB in
order to observe unencrypted network traffic sent over
the signaling plane. Next, the sensor observes TA
commands being issued to the target UE. This not
only gives the sensor an idea of the approximate
distance the UE is from the eNB, but also the absolute
time at which the UE will transmit its next uplink
burst. With the latter information, it is possible for the
sensor to monitor the time of flight of that burst and
thus calculate the sensor-UE distance. These inferred
distances are then used to multi-laterate the target
position.
5. Two-Step Algorithm for Localization
We propose a two-step (2S) algorithm for R3 local-
ization of mobile devices in urban environments. The
proposed algorithm is low-cost, easy to implement, and
passive, thus not requiring already strained network
resources. Further, it mitigates the weakness shown in
Section 3.
5.1. Step 1: Positioning in R2
In the first step, the UE position p2 in R2 is esti-
mated using (4) [7], [12]. To realize optimal or near-
optimal results we utilize the maximum-likelihood
estimate (MLE) in R2 found via [19]
∑
i





(di − d̂i)(y − yi)
σ2i di
= 0. (8)
We note here that, in practice, solving (7) and (8) is not
realistic as the true location p = [x, y]T of the target
UE is required. Therefore, alternate pragmatic means
1The interested reader is referred to [6], [7], [22], and [20]) for
a more detailed treatment of the CeSAR method.
for reasonable estimates of location in R2 exist, such





(d̂i− ∥ p̂ − pi ∥2)2, (9)
where pi is the location of the ith eNB. We also note
that because the desired estimate lies in R3, the result
of first locating in R2 will introduce some inevitable
error which was studied in [17]. Thus, we provide a
second step to not only close the gap on this error,
but to improve beyond previous limitations pointed out
in [17].
5.2. Step 2: Obtaining Orthogonal Information
In the second step, a CeSAR sensor, as described
in Section 4 and [22], is placed at the refined p̂2
location. We qualify the sensor location as refined since
pragmatic steps can be used to optimize the estimate
beyond simply placing the sensor at p̂2 when it is
known that the UE is located inside a building or not
at ground level.
First, the k-nearest neighbor buildings are found to
the unrefined p̂2. Each of the k neighbors are then
used to range the UE at each building location. The
neighbor with the lowest distance estimate d̂s is then
taken as the most probable building location of the UE
and p̂2 is updated accordingly. We describe this step
as “building rounding”.
The final position estimate in R3 is then obtained
by combining the available information via
p̂3 = [p̂2, d̂s]
T
. (10)
5.3. Considerations in Implementation
The potential application base of 2S is broad. While
we present it as a location-based attack in cellular net-
works, the application of the algorithm need not hold
to such myopia. It is easy to see how 2S could be used
by a motivated attacker to locate a target; less trivial is
how such a method would be used for legitimate LBS.
Specifically, constantly moving cellular infrastructure
to iteratively locate a UE of interest may not be
realistic in a commercial network deployment. In this
case, we propose a change to cellular architecture to
support this type of urban positioning. Namely, we
propose the installation of many such fixed CeSAR
sensors at the base of points of interest. For instance,
dominant high-rises in a cityscape may serve as ideal
locations for installation. While such adjustments to
the status quo of physical cellular architecture are
generally economically undesirable, the nascence of
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Figure 3: The performance of localization in R3
via different positioning algorithms is shown. The
building rounding technique, used in the 2S algo-
rithm, is shown to be highly significant such that
accuracy is improved beyond that of MLE.
5G technology may provide the appropriate segway for
such a shift. Because of the proposed high-frequency
spectral real estate proposed for 5G [3], maintaining
line-of-sight between a UE and its serving infras-
tructure becomes more important to maintain quality
of service. We therefore propose that integration of
the CeSAR sensor with next-generation architecture is
viable.
6. Experimental Validation
In this section, we show the 2S algorithm to out-
perform standard MLE localization in R3. We first
demonstrate its efficacy in a generic scenario. We then
use a model of downtown Honolulu with measure-
ments taken in an actual off-location LTE network
deployment to predict how the method will perform
in a real-world environment.
6.1. Generic Results
In this simulation, we consider a 500 m × 500 m no-
tional tracking area. Building positions are modeled as
a Poisson point process with intensity λ = 20. Building
heights are modeled as a uniform RV U ∈ (10,400) m.
The experiment is evaluated via the Monte Carlo
method by simulating a new generic urban center with
each iteration. During each trial, four buildings are
selected at random to be the host for a parasitic cell
tower which sits on the roof, as is common practice in
actual urban deployments. Finally, the TA is simulated
with a Gaussian measurement error where σ = 50 m
which has been shown to be a reasonable error and also
as an appropriate surrogate for the otherwise descrete
TA measurement [7]. That error is then rounded to the
nearest 78.125 m in line with how the TA presents
in an actual LTE network deployment. Also in line
with the results of [7], the sensor measurement error
is modeled as Gaussian where σ = 10 m.
The results of the first investigation, shown in Fig-
ure 3 as a cumulative distribution function (CDF)2,
contrast the 2S algorithm with the MLE. The result-
ing circular error probable (CEP) 70%3 accuracy is
approximately 76 m, 72 m, and 13 m for 2S without
building rounding, MLE, and 2S with building round-
ing respectively. The improvement in performance of
63 m CEP 70% of the 2S method with the building
rounding technique illustrates the potency of this por-
tion of the algorithm. However, even without rounding,
2S performs comparable to MLE, which is practically
unrealistic to use (cf. (7) and (8)). Further, it is clear
that 2S with building rounding outperforms MLE and
2S without building rounding in all scenarios, even at
the tail of the error distribution.
6.2. Downtown Honolulu Results
The goal of this simulation is to demonstrate the
efficacy of 2S (with building rounding) in an ac-
tual urban environment. To this end, a portion of
downtown Honolulu, shown in Figure 4, measuring
approximately 400 m × 600 m was selected. The
area under consideration is bounded by Bethel, South
Beretania, and Alakea Streets on the North, East,
and South respectively. The western border of the
area under consideration is established by Ala Moana
Boulevard. Twenty-seven of the most prominent build-
ings in this fifteen-block urban center were modeled
by latitude, longitude, and approximate building height
(which ranged from 16 m to 136 m when height is
approximated at 4 m per building story). The location
of four buildings which serve as hosts to parasitic
eNBs were identified via publicly available antenna
registration records and imagery, and used as such in
this simulation.
Again, Monte Carlo trials were used to evaluate
performance. The target location was chosen randomly,
with uniform distribution, inside one of the 27 build-
ings with random height inside of that building. The
2The CDF is defined as the probability that a realization of a RV
will be less than some constant value x, (i.e., FX(x) = Pr[X ≤ x]).
3CEP 70% is explicitly defined in terms of the CDF as
FX(0.7) = Pr[X ≤ 0.7].
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Figure 4: The area under consideration is a five by
three block portion of downtown Honolulu measur-
ing approximately 600 m × 400 m in area. Twenty-
seven of the largest buildings are modeled in the
simulation, four of which have been identified as
hosting parasitic cell towers. The border of the
area under consideration is established by Bethel
St., S. Beretania St., Alakea St., and Ala Moana
Blvd. Imagery ©2017 Google, Map Data ©2017
Google.
TAs used were recorded from real-world off-site LTE
network deployments and applied to the simulated
eNBs. For CeSAR sensor data, actual radio frequency
ranging measurements taken at 900 MHz, also col-
lected off site, were used [7]. These measurements
were obtained by transmitting a pseudo-noise sequence
and then using a matched filter at the receiver.
The results of this experiment are presented in Fig-
ure 5 again as a CDF. Here we see 2S (with building
rounding) providing significant gains over MLE. At the
CEP 70% level, MLE provides 76 m of accuracy while
2S provides 17 m of accuracy. The step-wise nature of
the curve representing 2S is due to the discrete nature
of the radio ranging measurements used as the CeSAR
sensor data (set by the maximum sample rate of the
equipment). In fact, the correct building is always
found during the first step of 2S thus the error realized
is only that due to inaccuracies in measuring height.
This realistic result demonstrates the power inherent in
2S.
7. Dénouement
In this paper, we have extended previous results
which reported on and quantified the vulnerability of
LTE to user privacy via signaling plane information.













Figure 5: In this figure, the performance of 2S is
evaluated against MLE in a simulation environ-
ment which models downtown Honolulu. Measure-
ments from an actual off-site network deployment
are used in this simulation. Significant improve-
ment is realized through 2S demonstrating the
efficacy of the method in a realistic urban environ-
ment.
Specifically, we extended these results from R2 to
a model more appropriate to urban deployments in
R3, an undeniably three-dimensional cityscape. Ac-
companying this extension, a novel algorithm, 2S, for
urban positioning was proposed which leveraged the
exploitation previously identified in CeSAR. 2S was
shown to mitigate poor GDoP which is specific to po-
sitioning in R3. The performance of 2S was examined
in two simulation testbeds utilizing the Monte Carlo
method. In the first, a generic city center was randomly
generated to assess general performance. Next, a model
of downtown Honolulu was created to assess the
performance in a specific, real-world environment. In
both cases, 2S was found to outperform the MLE taken
directly on R3 and provided accuracies on the order of
15 m CEP 70%.
These results highlight the need for a minor, but sig-
nificant shift in LTE security architecture. By moving
the signaling plane under the umbrella of encryption,
the potency of this vulnerability would be dramati-
cally reduced. Instead, the confluence of its current
plaintext form and nascent SDR technology threatens
location privacy in a very real way. Additionally, we
put forth that when designing for future generations of
cellular deployments, such as 5G, a balance between
performance and security should be held in tension.
Our relentless pursuit of the Shannon limit must be
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tempered with a respect for the privacy and security of
those who will ultimately benefit from these emerging
technologies.
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